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MCP Server for Ad Security Research
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A 6-phase agentic security research pipeline exposed as MCP tools - from attack surface profiling to coordinated disclosure. Runs inside Claude Code, Cursor, or any MCP host. Bring your own LLM.
Installation · Quick Start · Agent Config · Pipeline · Tools · Session Resume · Pro · Troubleshooting · Disclaimer
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<a id="installation"></a>
Global install (recommended)
Run without installing
De
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<a id="quick-start"></a>
Step 1 - Copy the example agent config
Step 2 - Register with your MCP host
For Claude Code - add to .mcp.json in your project root:
For global registration, use ~/.claude/claude_desktop_config.json with the same structure.
If running from a local clone, replace "npx" + "args": ["hyperdope"] with:
Step 3 - Run the full pipeline
That's it. Hyperdope runs all 6 phases sequentially, chains context automatically, and writes a session file to .hyperdope/sessions/.
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<a id="agent-config"></a>
Copy agent.example.yaml to agent.yaml. Hyperdope resolves it in this order:
1. --agent path/to/agent.yaml CLI flag
2. HYPERDOPE_AGENT en
3. ./agent.yaml in the current working directory
4. Error with instructions
Full annotated schema:
En resolution - any ${VAR} reference in the YAML is resolved at runtime. Missing throw with the name in the error message.
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<a id="pipeline"></a>
Each phase's output context field is the exact input for the next phase's context argument. hd_run handles this automatically. Indi tools can be called standalone for custom workflows.
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<a id="tools"></a>
hd_profile - Phase 1: Attack Surface ProfileMaps the target's complete attack surface across all relevant categories.
What it covers: trust boundaries, parser differentials, deserialization paths, supply chain dependencies, authentication and authorization flows, LLM-specific surfaces (prompt injection entry points, tool call abuse, RAG poisoning, agentic multi-hop chains), file system race conditions, cryptographic weaknesses, SSRF-reachable internal endpoints.
Input
Output
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hd_audit - Phase 2: HuntSystematically reasons through applicable classes for each surface category found in Phase 1.
What it covers:
Findings are rated by exploitability: confirmed, likely, or theoretical.
Input
Output
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hd_confirm - Phase 3: PoC GenerationWrites a minimal, self-contained, deterministic Proof of Concept for a specific audit finding.
PoC output structure:
Requires Li: YES / NOInput
Output
python\nimport pickle, requests\n...\n
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hd_assess - Phase 4: CVSS v3.1 + CWE ScoringScores the using chain-of-thought reasoning through each CVSS v3.1 metric before committing to a numeric score. Ne - reasons through AV, AC, PR, UI, S, C, I, A indi.
C reasoned through:
| Metric | Options | Key question |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Attack (AV) | N / A / L / P | How far can the attacker be? |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | L / H | Are special conditions required? |
| Pri Required (PR) | N / L / H | What account level does the attacker need? |
| User Interaction (UI) | N / R | Does a need to act? |
| Scope (S) | U / C | Does impact cross component boundaries? |
| Confidentiality (C) | N / L / H | How much data is exposed? |
| Integrity (I) | N / L / H | Can data be modified? |
| A (A) | N / L / H | Can the system be disrupted? |
Input
Output
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hd_draft_ghsa - Phase 5: GHSA DraftProduces a GitHub Security Ad draft following the GitHub Ad Database schema exactly.
Schema fields produced:ghsa_id (PENDING) · se · summary (≤100 chars) · details (full markdown) · affected (package + ranges) · references · published: null · withdrawn: null · aliases: [] · database_specific (cwes, c + score)
Input
Output
yaml\nghsa_id: PENDING\nse: CRITICAL\nsummary: \"RCE deserialization in upload endpoint\"\n...\n
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hd_disclose - Phase 6: Coordinated Disclosure PackageProduces three distinct documents in a single LLM call, each calibrated for a different audience.
| Output | Audience | Content |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Executi | CISO, VP Eng, Board | 2 paragraphs, no CVE IDs or C - business impact + recommended response |
| Technical Ad | Security engineers, devs, IR | Root cause, affected , CVSS, CWE, attack scenario, detection IoCs, remediation steps, timeline |
| Email Template | 's security team | Professional tone, summary, C, 90-day disclosure timeline, PoC offer under embargo |
Input
Output
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hd_scan — Phase 0: Dependency & Supply-Chain ScanScans a local directory against the OSV.dev C.
No API key or agent config required — runs entirely local + public APIs.
What it covers: npm (package-lock.json / package.json), Python
(requirements.txt / poetry.lock / Pipfile.lock), Go (go.mod), Rust (Cargo.lock),
hardcoded secrets (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, Anthropic/OpenAI keys, PEM blocks),
npm lifecycle hooks (postinstall / preinstall), dependency confusion suspects,
ghost endpoints (remo still in git history), SBOM-lite generation.
Input
Output — findings[] contains OSV CVEs, secrets, hooks, ghost endpoints, confusion suspects.meta contains package counts, ecosystem list, and SBOM. sbom contains the full SBOM-lite object.
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hd_ — Patch PhaseDetermines whether pre reported are actually fixed in a
patched . Uses a 4-question methodology:
1. Root cause identification — what exact code path caused the original finding?
2. Change analysis — does the patch close that exact path, or only a symptom?
3. bypass check — are there alternati that bypass the fix?
4. Sibling site audit — are there other locations in the codebase with the same pattern?
: PATCHED · STILL_ · PARTIAL_FIX · CANNOT_
Run after hd_assess (or hd_confirm) when a patch is a.
Input
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hd_run - Full Pipeline (all 6 phases)Runs phases 1–6 sequentially. Context is chained automatically - no manual wiring needed.
Input
Output
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<a id="session-resume"></a>
Every hd_run execution writes a session file to .hyperdope/sessions/{timestamp}.json. The file is append-safe - resuming ne completed phases.
To resume from any phase:
1. Open the session file:
2. Copy the context object from the last completed phase's result.
3. Call the next phase tool with that context:
Indi phase tool calls (hd_audit, hd_confirm, etc.) also write their results to the session file when a context argument is passed in.
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<a id="pro"></a>
| provider value | SDK | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| claude | -ai/sdk | Anthropic Claude (Sonnet, Opus, Haiku) |
| openai | openai | GPT-4o, GPT-4 Turbo, o1, etc. |
| gemini | /generative-ai | Gemini 1.5 Pro, Flash, 2.0 |
| ollama | fetch | Local models at localhost:11434 |
| glm | openai + base_url | Zhipu GLM-4, openai-compatible |
| kimi | openai + base_url | Moonshot Kimi, openai-compatible |
| qwen | openai + base_url | Alibaba Qwen, openai-compatible |
Any OpenAI-compatible endpoint works with provider: openai + base_url pointing to the API.
Provider config examples:
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<a id="troubleshooting"></a>
| Problem | Fix |
| --- | --- |
| Cannot read agent config: ... | Check the path in --agent or HYPERDOPE_AGENT. File must exist and be valid YAML. |
| Missing required en : CLAUDE_API_KEY | Export the before starting the host: export CLAUDE_API_KEY=sk-ant-... or add it to the MCP host's env block. |
| Unknown provider: "..." | Check provider: in agent.yaml - valid : claude, openai, gemini, ollama, glm, kimi, qwen. |
| Tool returns "status": "partial" | The LLM response didn't produce parseable JSON. The full response is still in raw. Check the model's output or lower temperature. |
| MCP host doesn't see the tools | Restart the host after editing .mcp.json. node -- ≥ 20. |
| Ollama connection refused | Start Ollama: ollama serve. Confirm the model is pulled: ollama pull llama3.1:70b. |
| Rate limit / 429 errors | Add temperature and max_tokens guards in agent.yaml, or switch to a provider with higher limits. |
| Session file not created | hd_run writes to .hyperdope/sessions/ relative to the cwd where the MCP host launched the server. Check launch directory. |
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<a id="disclaimer"></a>
Hyperdope is for authorized security research, penetration testing, disclosure programs, and CTF competitions only. You must ha written authorization before targeting any system you do not own.
The built-in prompts are designed for ad research. PoC output from hd_confirm should be handled as sensiti. Ad drafts from hd_draft_ghsa and hd_disclose should follow responsible disclosure practices - notify the before public release.
The authors assume no liability for misuse.
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MIT
开发语言:JavaScript
Star 数:8
该项目属于安全软件方向的开源资源,代码结构清晰,适合安全研究人员学习参考。项目围绕Hyperdope is a suite of autonomous agents that audit code, hunt 0days, and ship coordinated-disclosure advisories - the way a top-tier research team works, at machine speed.展开,提供了可运行的实现,对理解相关安全机制、工具原理与攻防技术具有较高的研究价值。
从技术实现角度看,此类项目的核心在于对底层原理的深入理解与工程化落地。开发者在研究过程中可以结合官方文档与社区讨论,梳理项目的初始化流程、核心模块职责与数据流转,逐步掌握其中的技术细节与设计思路。
1. 下载源码压缩包,解压到本地环境。
2. 根据项目类型准备对应的运行环境与依赖。
3. 按照 README 中的步骤完成配置与部署。
4. 在隔离的测试环境中运行验证,避免影响生产系统。
本资源来源于开源社区,仅供安全研究、技术学习与合法授权范围内的攻防演练使用,请勿用于任何非法或侵害他人权益的用途。使用本项目产生的一切后果由使用者自行承担。
| 资源标题 | hyperdope - Hyperdope is a suite of autonomous agents that aud |
| 所属分类 | 安全软件 |
| 发布作者 | admin |
| 发布时间 | 2026-10-05 23:06:37 |
| 下载权限 | 免费下载 |
| 附件数量 | 2 个下载链接 |
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| 主题状态 | 正常讨论中 |