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<h1 align="center">AI OSINT</h1>
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<b>Curated OSINT resources for disco exposed AI infrastructure — dorks, queries, tools, and techniques for LLM, AI agent, and ML pipeline reconnaissance.</b>
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<a href="CONTRIBUTING.md"><img src=" alt="PRs"></a>
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<code>187,000+ Ollama servers exposed</code> · <code>370,000+ Grok con indexed</code> · <code>AI credential leaks up 81% YoY</code> · <code>150M+ MCP downloads affected by systemic RCE</code> · <code>300K+ ChatGPT creds on dark web</code>
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> AI OSINT is a curated collection of Google dorks, Shodan queries, GitHub dorks, Censys queries, Sigma detection rules, threat intelligence, and security tools for finding exposed artificial intelligence infrastructure on the internet. It covers LLM endpoints (Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio), AI chatbot con leaks (ChatGPT, Grok, Perplexity), databases (Qdrant, Weaviate, ChromaDB, Milvus, Pinecone), AI agent gateways (OpenClaw, MCP servers), MLOps platforms (MLflow, Jupyter, Kubeflow), leaked AI API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, HuggingFace, Groq, Replicate, Cohere, Mistral, DeepSeek, Ele), and AI image generation services (Stable Diffusion, ComfyUI). Designed for Red Team operators, penetration testers, bug bounty hunters, and OSINT researchers working in AI/ML security.
It now also covers MCP supply chain attacks (systemic STDIO RCE, marketplace poisoning), AI IDE exploitation (Copilot YOLO mode, Windsurf zero-click), AI model leak incidents (Claude Code source map, DeepSeek ClickHouse exposure), AI-assisted discovery (Mythos/Glasswing), and ChatGPT data exfiltration techniques.
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Organizations are deploying LLMs, databases, and AI agents faster than they can secure them. The result:
This repository gives Red Team operators and OSINT professionals the exact queries to find it all.
Inspired by: 7WaySecurity/cloud_osint
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KEYWORD Con — Read This FirstAs of v1.3.0, every dork and query in this repository uses a KEYWORD placeholder in place of the secret-seeking value strings (passwords, tokens, credentials, etc.) that used to be hard-coded.
Replace KEYWORD with a term you are authorized to search for:
site: / hostname: / org: filter)What stays: service fingerprints (product titles, API paths, ports, env- like OPENAI_API_KEY, key prefixes like sk-proj-) are kept as-is — they identify the *service or format*, not a specific 's secret.
Why: documenting *that* a class of system is commonly misconfigured, and *how* to check your own exposure, is legitimate defensive and red-team work. Shipping copy-paste queries whose only function is to maximize the yield of *other people's* li is not. The KEYWORD con keeps every technique here useful for authorized testing without being a turnkey har kit.
If a hit surfaces a third party's secret, that is not your finding to act on — report it responsibly and move on.
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| Section | What You'll Find |
|---|---|
| Google Dorks | Queries for ChatGPT, Grok, HuggingFace, dashboards, config files |
| GitHub Dorks | Leaked API keys for 20+ AI pro, MCP configs, system prompts |
| Shodan Queries | Ollama, vLLM, OpenClaw, Gradio, DBs, MLflow, Jupyter |
| Censys Queries | Alternati queries for all AI services |
| AI Service Endpoints | URL patterns, default ports, API fingerprinting |
| API Key Patterns | Prefixes, regex, for every major AI provider |
| DB Recon | Endpoints to enumerate Qdrant, Weaviate, ChromaDB, Milvus |
| MCP & Agent Exposure | The most critical emerging attack surface in AI security |
| Threat Intelligence | Operation Bizarre Bazaar, Clawdbot crisis, MCP supply chain |
| Tools | AI-specific only — scanners, red team frameworks, key detectors |
| Detection Rules | Sigma rules for monitoring AI infrastructure |
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> Full collection: dorks/google/
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> Full collection: dorks/github/
>
> ⚠️ Syntax note: GitHub migrated to new Code Search. Use path:*.env instead of legacy filename:.env. Queries below use modern syntax where applicable.
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> Full collection: dorks/shodan/
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> Full collection: dorks/censys/
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| Provider | API Endpoint | Shared Content |
|---|---|---|
| OpenAI | api.openai.com/v1/* | chatgpt.com/share/* |
| Anthropic | api.anthropic.com/v1/* | — |
| Google | generati.googleapis.com//* | — |
| xAI | api.x.ai/v1/* | grok.com/share/* |
| Mistral | api.mistral.ai/v1/* | — |
| Cohere | api.cohere.ai/v1/* | — |
| DeepSeek | api.deepseek.com/v1/* | — |
| Groq | api.groq.com/openai/v1/* | — |
| HuggingFace | api-inference.huggingface.co/models/* | huggingface.co/spaces/* |
| Ele | api.ele.io/v1/* | — |
| Service | Port | Auth Default | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ollama | 11434 | ❌ None | 🔴 Critical |
| vLLM | 8000 | ❌ None | 🔴 Critical |
| OpenClaw | 18789 | ❌ None (fixed in rebrand) | 🔴 Critical |
| Gradio | 7860 | ❌ None | 🔴 Critical |
| Streamlit | 8501 | ❌ None | 🟡 High |
| MLflow | 5000 | ❌ None | 🔴 Critical |
| Qdrant | 6333/6334 | ❌ None | 🔴 Critical |
| Weaviate | 8080 (+ gRPC 50051) | ❌ None | 🟡 High |
| ChromaDB | 8000 | ❌ None (binds localhost) | 🟡 High |
| Milvus | 19530 (+ mgmt 9091) | ❌ None | 🟡 High |
| Jupyter | 8888 | ✅ Token (often disabled) | 🟡 High |
| LM Studio | 1234 | ❌ None | 🟡 High |
| GPT4All | 4891 | ❌ None | 🟡 High |
| Flowise | 3000 | ❌ None | 🔴 Critical |
| LiteLLM Proxy | 4000 | ❌ None | 🔴 Critical |
| Open WebUI | 3000/8080 | ✅ Auth (default) | 🟡 High |
| nginx-ui | 443/9000 | ✅ Auth (bypassable) | 🔴 Critical |
| ClickHouse | 8123/9000 | ❌ None | 🔴 Critical |
| TGI (HuggingFace) | 8080 | ❌ None | 🟡 High |
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| Provider | Prefix | Length | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenAI | sk-proj- | ~80+ chars | Current format since April 2024 |
| Anthropic | sk-ant-api03- | ~90+ chars | API keys |
| Anthropic OAuth | sk-ant-oat01- | — | OAuth tokens (Files API, etc.) |
| Google AI | AIzaSy | 39 chars | ⚠️ Same prefix for Maps AND Gemini |
| HuggingFace | hf_ | ~34 chars | Read/write access tokens |
| Replicate | r8_ | ~40 chars | — |
| Groq | gsk_ | ~52 chars | — |
> ⚠️ Google AIzaSy warning: Google uses the same prefix for ALL Cloud APIs. A Maps API key embedded in public Ja can silently gain Gemini API access if the Generati API is enabled on the same project. This was documented as a significant issue in early 2026.
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When exposed, databases leak proprietary embeddings, sensiti, and internal knowledge bases used in RAG systems.
| Database | List Collections | Extract Data |
|---|---|---|
| Qdrant | GET /collections | POST /collections/{name}/points/scroll |
| Weaviate | GET /v1/schema | GET /v1/objects?class={name} |
| ChromaDB | GET /api/v2/collections ⚠️ | POST /api/v2/collections/{id}/query |
| Milvus | gRPC ListCollections | gRPC Search/Query |
> ⚠️ ChromaDB API update: v1.0.0+ migrated to /api/v2. The legacy /api/v1/collections now returns a deprecation error. Update your recon scripts accordingly.
---
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is the most critical emerging attack surface in AI security (2025-2026).
MCP servers connect AI models to shell access, file systems, databases, and APIs. Misconfigurations expose:
.env files readable by agents| Incident | Date | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| OpenClaw Shodan Exposure | Jan 2026 | 4,000+ agent gateways, many with zero auth and RCE |
| Operation Bizarre Bazaar | Dec 2025–Jan 2026 | 35,000 attacks on LLM/MCP endpoints; commercial resale |
| Smithery Registry Breach | 2025 | Fly.io token → control of 3,000+ MCP servers |
| mcp-remote C | 2025 | Command injection in 437K+ installs |
| Cursor IDE MCP Trust Issue | 2025 | Persistent RCE repo configs (CVSS 7.2-8.8) |
| MCP Systemic RCE (Ox Security) | Apr 2026 | 150M+ downloads, 200K servers, 10+ CVEs, 9/11 marketplaces poisoned |
| nginx-ui MCPwn (C) | Mar 2026 | CVSS 9.8, actively exploited, full Nginx takeover in 2 requests |
| Atlassian MCPwnfluence | Apr 2026 | C/27826 — RCE chain from LAN, no auth required |
| MCP TypeScript SDK Data Leak | Apr 2026 | C — cross-client data leak in shared McpSer |
| Windsurf Zero-Click RCE | Apr 2026 | C — zero-click prompt injection → local RCE via MCP |
> 📖 Full timeline: threat-intel/THREAT_INTELLIGENCE.md
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> Full entries: threat-intel/
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> Only AI-specific tools. Full details: tools/TOOLS.md
> For generic OSINT tools (Shodan, Censys, etc.) see cloud_osint.
| Tool | What It Does | By |
|---|---|---|
| Garak | LLM scanner — "nmap for LLMs" | NVIDIA |
| PyRIT | AI red teaming framework — Crescendo, jailbreaking, multi-turn | Microsoft |
| promptfoo | LLM pentesting CLI — 133+ attack plugins | OpenAI |
| DeepTeam | 50+ vulns, 20+ attacks, OWASP/MITRE mapping | Confident AI |
| API Radar | Real-time leaked AI API key monitoring on GitHub | Independent |
| KeyLeak Detector | Web scanner for 200+ patterns incl. 15+ AI pro | Independent |
| promptmap | ChatGPT dorks & prompt injection testing | Utku Şen |
| MCP | MCP database with CVEs and PoCs | Community |
| MCPSafetyScanner | MCP ser auditing tool | Academic (Leidos) |
| Cisco AI Supply Chain Scanners | Scanners for MCP, A2A, pickle files, agentic skill files | Cisco Talos |
| DorkEye | Automated Google Dorking with multi-agent analysis pipeline | Open Source |
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> Full Sigma rules: detection-rules/SIGMA_RULES.md
12 Sigma detection rules co:
auth_mode: none---
| Source | Finding | Link |
|---|---|---|
| SentinelOne + Censys | 175,108 exposed Ollama hosts across 130 countries | SecurityWeek |
| Cisco Talos | 1,100+ Ollama servers, 20% serving models without auth | Cisco Blog |
| Pillar Security | Operation Bizarre Bazaar: 35,000 LLMjacking attacks | Pillar Security |
| GitGuardian | AI credential leaks surged 81% YoY; 29M secrets on GitHub | Report |
| AuthZed | Complete MCP security breaches timeline | Blog |
| Pangea | Sensitive data in indexed ChatGPT histories | Blog |
| Trail of Bits | 8 high-se vulns in Gradio 5 audit | Blog |
| Oasis Security | "Claudy Day" — 3 vulns chained for data exfiltration from Claude | Blog |
| Forbes | ~600 Claude con indexed by Google | Article |
| Obsidian Security | 143K+ LLM chats (incl. Claude) on Archive.org | Blog |
| TechRadar | Claude Code 512K source lines leaked via npm | Article |
| Penligent | Claude Code source map leak analysis | Blog |
| Ox Security | 150M+ MCP downloads affected by systemic RCE, 10+ CVEs, 9/11 marketplaces poisoned | Blog |
| Anthropic Red Team | Claude Mythos: thousands of 0-days, C, sandbox escape | red.anthropic.com |
| IBM X-Force | 300K+ ChatGPT creds on dark web, supply chain attacks 4x in 5 years | Report |
| Check Point | ChatGPT DNS exfiltration — silent data leakage via side channel | Blog |
| Zscaler ThreatLabz | Claude Code source leak + Vidar/GhostSocks malware lure | Blog |
| Cisco AI | State of AI Security 2026 — MCP, A2A, agentic AI scanners | Report |
| LeakIX | 12,269 additional exposed Ollama instances, auth PR rejection critique | Blog |
| CSA | Time-to-exploit now under 20 hours (Mythos briefing) | HelpNetSecurity |
| Wiz | Claude Mythos practical guidance — "Y2K moment" for cybersecurity | Blog |
| Wiz | DeepSeek ClickHouse exposure — 1M+ log entries with plaintext chats | Blog |
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The resources in this repository are for authorized security testing, education, and legitimate research only.
1. Obtain proper authorization before testing infrastructure you do not own
2. Follow applicable laws (CFAA, GDPR, local equi)
3. Report responsibly through appropriate disclosure channels
4. Ne discovered misconfigurations for unauthorized access
The authors assume no liability for misuse.
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PRs welcome! Please dorks/queries work before submitting. See CONTRIBUTING.md.
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Code: MIT · Data & Documentation: CC BY-SA 4.0
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<p align="center"><b>Maintained by <a href=" · Last updated June 2026 · v1.4.0</p>
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该项目属于红蓝攻防方向的开源资源,代码结构清晰,适合安全研究人员学习参考。项目围绕🤖 Curated AI OSINT resources — Google dorks, Shodan queries, GitHub dorks, and techniques to discover exposed LLM endpoints, leaked AI API keys, misconfigured vector databases, and unprotected AI agents展开,提供了可运行的实现,对理解相关安全机制、工具原理与攻防技术具有较高的研究价值。
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| 资源标题 | ai_osint - 🤖 Curated AI OSINT resources — Google dorks, Shoda |
| 所属分类 | 红蓝攻防 |
| 发布作者 | admin |
| 发布时间 | 2026-10-06 00:48:37 |
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